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 Non-technical Summary 
Reforms, such as a higher pension age, are highly unpopular although they are a demographic 
necessity. Hence, a sound understanding of reform resistance is desirable. Preceding studies 
have explored numerous important drivers of pension reform acceptance. According to these 
insights, an individual’s socio-economic characteristics like gender, income or age matter as 
does the degree of information on the extent of the system imbalances. So far, however, the 
literature has not looked into another potential source of reform resistance which is related to 
an individual’s (dis-)utility from work. Thus, this contribution argues that intrinsic motivation 
must not be overlooked in a comprehensive analysis of pension reform preferences. Pension 
reforms impose or reduce restrictions on ageing citizens to offer their work at the labor mar-
ket. Therefore, an individual’s work motivation should have an impact on reform preferences. 
People with intrinsic work motivation will be less anxious about longer working years com-
pared to people for whom work is a burden.  
To specify the theoretical link between work motivation and pension reform acceptance, we 
regard the formation of pension age preferences within the framework of an optimal job sepa-
ration decision. In this framework, a higher pension age should be a relatively attractive re-
form option for intrinsically motivated workers compared to the reform alternatives of cutting 
pensions or increasing contributions. 
In the empirical part, this prediction is tested for data from the representative ALLBUS survey 
(German General Social Survey) of the German population. The results strongly confirm that 
(lacking) intrinsic work motivation is a robust determinant for individual (resistance and) 
support for a higher pension age. This key result has numerous implications, both for the in-
trinsic motivation literature and our understanding of reform processes. So far, intrinsic moti-
vation has been recognized to be important for the efficiency of firms and organizations. Our 
findings point beyond that insight towards the formation of policy preferences and the adapta-
bility of modern welfare states and societies. A lack of non-monetary incentives will contrib-
ute to the blockade of reforms which require more work effort. Hence, a society for which 
work is perceived as a nuisance will have much larger problems to adjust to the necessities of 
demographic change compared to a society with high work ethics.  
 
 Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Reformen wie die Einführung eines höheren Rentenalters sind denkbar unpopulär, obwohl sie 
angesichts der demografischen Entwicklung unausweichlich erscheinen. Reformpolitisch ist 
ein besseres Verständnis solcher Reformwiderstände wünschenswert. Bisherige Untersuchun-
gen haben dabei vor allem den Einfluss sozioökonomischer Charakteristika, wie z. B. Ge-
schlecht, Alter oder Einkommen, sowie den Informationsstand der Individuen in den Blick 
genommen. Faktoren, die mit den individuellen Arbeitspräferenzen zusammenhängen, wur-
den hingegen bislang vernachlässigt. Dieser Beitrag untersucht daher die Rolle der intrinsi-
schen Arbeitsmotivation zur Erklärung von Reformpräferenzen. Solche nicht-monetären Ar-
beitsanreize sollten in einer umfassenden Analyse von Reformwiderständen berücksichtigt 
werden. So ist zu erwarten, dass Menschen mit hoher intrinsischer Motivation einen geringe-
ren Nutzenverlust durch eine Anhebung des Renteneintrittsalters erfahren als Personen, die 
Arbeit als eine große Last empfinden.  
Wir betrachten dazu zunächst die Bildung von individuellen Rentenreformpräferenzen im 
Rahmen einer optimalen Arbeits-/Rentenentscheidung („job separation decision“). Demnach 
sollte für ein Individuum mit hoher intrinsischer Motivation eine Anhebung des Rentenein-
trittsalters eine relativ attraktive Reformoption im Vergleich zu den Alternativen einer Ren-
tenkürzung oder höherer Rentenbeiträge sein. 
Wir testen diese Hypothese anhand repräsentativer Daten der Allgemeinen Bevölkerungsum-
frage der Sozialwissenschaften (ALLBUS). Dabei erweist sich eine hohe intrinsische Ar-
beitsmotivation als eine robuste Determinante individueller Rentenreformpräferenzen. Unser 
Ergebnis ergänzt somit die Literatur zur intrinsischen Motivation und trägt ebenfalls zu einem 
verbesserten Verständnis von Reformprozessen und deren Determinanten bei. Während die 
Bedeutung intrinsischer Arbeitsmotivation bislang lediglich vor dem Hintergrund der Effizi-
enz von Organisationen bzw. Unternehmen betrachtet wurde, belegen unsere Ergebnisse ihren 
Einfluss in der Bildung wirtschaftspolitischer Präferenzen. Fehlende nicht-monetäre Anreize 
treiben demnach den Widerstand gegenüber Reformen, die einen höheren Arbeitseinsatz er-
fordern. Gesellschaften, in denen Arbeit vorwiegend als Last wahrgenommen wird, stehen 
daher vor größeren Schwierigkeiten den Herausforderungen des demografischen Wandels 
gerecht zu werden als Gesellschaften mit einer hohen Arbeitsethik. 
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Abstract 
Although demographic change leaves pay-as-you-go pension systems unsustainable, reforms, 
such as a higher pension age, are highly unpopular. This contribution looks into the role of 
intrinsic motivation as a driver for pension reform acceptance. Theoretical reasoning suggests 
that this driver should be relevant: The choice among different pension reform options (in-
creasing pension age, increasing contributions, cutting pensions) can be analyzed within the 
framework of an optimal job separation decision. In this optimization, intrinsic job satisfac-
tion matters as it decreases the subjective costs of a higher pension age. We test this key hy-
pothesis on the basis of the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS). The results are unam-
biguous: In addition to factors such as age or education, the inclusion of intrinsic work moti-
vation helps to improve our prediction of an individual’s reform orientation. Our results are of 
importance for reform acceptance beyond the specific topic of pension reform. They point to 
the fact that the support for welfare state reform is also decided at the workplace. 
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1. Introduction 
Adjusting the structures of developed welfare states to population ageing remains one of the 
key challenges of economic policy in many industrial countries. Notwithstanding these neces-
sities, reform options such as a higher pension age are unpopular among the majority of voters 
albeit with substantial individual heterogeneity. Preceding studies have explored numerous 
important drivers of pension reform acceptance. According to these insights, an individual’s 
socio-economic characteristics like gender, income or age matter as does the degree of infor-
mation on the extent of the system imbalances. So far, however, the literature has not looked 
into another potential source of reform resistance which is related to an individual’s (dis-) 
utility from work. Hence, this contribution argues that intrinsic motivation, which has re-
ceived increasing attention on other fields of economic analysis, must not be overlooked in a 
comprehensive analysis of pension reform preferences. Pension reforms impose or reduce 
restrictions on ageing citizens to offer their work at the labor market. Therefore, an individu-
al’s work motivation should have an impact on reform preferences. People with intrinsic work 
motivation will be less anxious about longer working years compared to people for whom 
work is a burden.  
To specify the theoretical link between work motivation and pension reform acceptance, we 
regard the formation of pension age preferences within the framework of an optimal job sepa-
ration decision. In this context, the pension regime offers an outside option to the continuation 
of work and co-determines a reservation wage. If the older worker’s job does not pay the res-
ervation wage, the pension regime is more attractive. Intrinsic work motivation will, ceteris 
paribus, lower this reservation wage whereas someone with a large disutility from work will 
demand a higher compensation for staying in employment. Therefore, a higher pension age 
should be a relatively attractive reform option for intrinsically motivated workers compared to 
the reform alternatives of cutting pensions or increasing contributions. 
In the empirical part, this prediction is tested for data from the representative ALLBUS sur-
vey (German General Social Survey) of the German population. This test adds to the scarce 
literature on the drivers of pension reform acceptance (surveyed below) in at least two re-
spects. First, it is innovative as to the inclusion of intrinsic motivation and job satisfaction as a 
potential determinant of reform acceptance. As such, it also advances the intrinsic motivation 
literature, which, so far, is unrelated to the formation of policy preferences. Second, it does 
not look at pension reform in general but differentiates between three distinct reform options 
and their relative popularity: Cutting pensions, increasing contributions and lifting the pension 
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age. The results strongly confirm that (lacking) intrinsic work motivation is a robust determi-
nant for individual (resistance and) support for a higher pension age. A reversed effect is ob-
servable with respect to the support for higher pension contributions: Intrinsically motivated 
individuals are less than others willing to pay the price for early retirement through higher 
contributions. 
Our results indicate that intrinsic motivation is relevant for certain economic policy prefer-
ences as well, a finding which enriches the literature on intrinsic motivation by one important 
application. Non-monetary work incentives appear to be not only important for individual 
productivity or an organization’s efficiency but also for a country’s institutional adaptability. 
The findings point to the fact that the support for welfare state reforms is also decided at the 
workplace. 
The paper’s structure is as follows: Section 2 briefly surveys the literature on both the drivers 
of pension reform acceptance and the role of intrinsic motivation in economic contexts. Sec-
tion 3 derives the theoretical expectations to which extent intrinsic work motivation should 
impact on different pension reform options. The data and empirical results are presented in 
sections 4 and 5 followed by robustness checks and conclusions on the feasibility of pension 
reforms.  
 
2. Literature survey 
2.1 Pension reform preferences 
The existing scarce literature on the drivers of pension reform acceptance has successfully 
shed light on some important aspects. Individuals’ socio-economic characteristics help to ex-
plain variation: The young are more reform oriented than the old; males more than females; 
the rich more than the poor (Boeri et al., 2001, 2002). Much of this variation is obviously 
consistent with a self-interest view on the welfare state along the lines of Meltzer and Richard 
(1981) where voters judge welfare arrangements on the basis of their individual monetary net 
balance. Women (due to longer life expectation compared to men), the old (due to their more 
limited time horizon compared to the young), and the poor (due to the redistributive elements 
in pay-as-you-go systems and due to a larger unemployment risk compared to the rich) are 
relative winners of the status quo. Consistently, all these groups show a relative low inclina-
tion to accept reforms which cut back pensions or lift pension age. Scheubel et al. (2009) ex-
pand the standard set of self-interest related determinants to the individually expected work 
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ability at pension age and show that this expectation significantly drives the rejection of a 
higher retirement age. 
A further insight from this literature is that, beyond self-interest, information matters. Boeri et 
al. (2001, 2002) show for a survey of European citizens that they underestimate the costs of 
the system and have an unrealistic expectation of benefits. The better voters are informed, the 
more they support reforms which would allow for a partial opting out of mandatory pay-as-
you-go systems towards private funded schemes. For Italian survey data, Boeri and Tabellini 
(2010) find that voters are vastly uninformed about the cost and functioning of the pension 
system and that the degree of information helps to predict an individual’s readiness to accept 
reforms. However, even better information does not guarantee support for sustainability im-
proving reforms. Generally, reforms which cut back the size of pay-as-you-go systems lack 
support, even among those who are informed about an imminent pension crisis (Boeri et al., 
2002). 
In addition to self-interest and information related factors, the non-economic approaches 
stress that individual ideological views contribute to shape pension reform preferences. For 
example, Lynch and Myrskylä (2009) exploit Eurobarometer data to demonstrate that ideo-
logical proxies, such as general views on the welfare state or union membership, significantly 
influence individual positions on pension reforms. In a macro cross-national study, Schneider 
(2009) confirms that trade union power reduces the likelihood of pension reforms. At the 
same time, the objective reform need, measured on the basis of projected pension spending 
increases, speeds up reform activity.  
The existing literature is focused on the acceptance of pension reforms in general without 
paying particular attention to the drivers of relative popularity of different pension reform 
options. Yet, Boeri et al. (2002) present descriptive evidence for this relative attractiveness for 
their two country study. According to these results, a higher pension age is more attractive in 
Italy than in Germany with the reversed pattern for cutting pensions. 
None of the existing approaches have, however, included an individual’s utility or disutility 
from work. Thus, the picture remains incomplete. 
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2.2 Intrinsic motivation  
The key contribution of the intrinsic motivation literature to economics is its widening of the 
perspective on incentives. Deci’s definition is as follows: “One is said to be intrinsically mo-
tivated to perform an activity when one receives no apparent reward except the activity itself” 
(Deci, 1971: p. 105). Whereas, in particular in the context of principal-agent relationships, 
neoclassical economics has stressed the role of monetary or other extrinsic incentives, the 
intrinsic motivation literature corrects this unbalanced view. 
One insight of the literature is that monetary incentives or punishment might even be counter-
productive as these externally set constraints may crowd out intrinsic motivation (Bénabou 
and Tirole, 2003, 2006). The empirical evidence is manifold and ranges from experiments, 
where incentives crowd out reciprocity, over tax honesty, where fines may lead to lower tax 
morale, up to labor supply decisions, where the introduction of small monetary incentives for 
voluntary works may reduce supply or labor efficiency (Frey and Jegen, 2001; Frey, 2008). 
The existence of this second type of motivation has become important for modern economics’ 
advice on optimum institutions.  For instance, the conclusions relate to optimal organizational 
forms of modern companies with respect to an optimal balance of extrinsic and intrinsic moti-
vation to solve social dilemmas (Osterloh et al., 2002) or to the design of optimal knowledge 
transfer (Osterloh and Frey, 2000). 
Job satisfaction and intrinsic motivation are fostered by similar determinants and are mutually 
reinforcing. The literature on job satisfaction identifies determinants like autonomy, social 
relationships (at the work place), advancement opportunities, status and the absence of physi-
cal strain (Cornelißen, 2006); for a survey see Diaz-Serrano and Cabral Vieira (2005). Frey 
(1997a) has pointed out that intrinsic motivation rises the more interesting the task, the more 
personalized the principal-agent relationship and the greater the involvement of the agent is. 
For this reason, there is a strong link between intrinsic motivation and job satisfaction. In the 
following, we are not interested to disentangle this complex so we use both terms in an inter-
changeable way. 
Although the relevance of intrinsic motivation has thus been established in numerous con-
texts, there is one striking gap: So far, this concept has not been related to the formation of 
policy preferences. We aim at filling this gap in the context of pension reform acceptance – a 
field particularly promising since it is about government interference with individual freedom 
of choice to end working life. 
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3. Theoretical expectations 
Intuitively, there should be a link between pension reform preferences and intrinsic motiva-
tion. Somebody who obtains large intrinsic rewards from work should be more relaxed about 
a later pension age compared to somebody doing it “just for the money”. 
To analyze the impact of intrinsic work motivation on pension reform preference in a more 
precise way, it is useful to look at the preferred retirement age in the context of an optimizing 
job separation decision.1 The job separation literature assumes that it is optimal for both em-
ployers and employees that a worker leaves a firm whenever outside opportunities offer a 
more productive employment (Mortensen, 1978). Certainly, when reflecting retirement, the 
outside option is of a different nature and does not relate to the productivity (and wage) which 
can be achieved with another employer. This reflection, nevertheless, relates to another type 
of outside option which offers a pension in combination with increased leisure consumption. 
The combined features of this outside option (including factors such as wealth or non-labor 
income) determine an older worker’s reservation wage. Only if labor income for a given age 
still exceeds the reservation wage associated with the pension outside option, an individual 
will prefer work over retirement. Ceteris paribus, workers with a large disutility from work 
will have a higher reservation wage and a preference to retire earlier than those with moderate 
disutility or even positive utility from work. There is considerable evidence that individual 
retirement decisions are indeed heavily influenced by job satisfaction and working conditions 
(Blekesaune and Solem, 2005, and the survey in there) so that it appears promising to assume 
a similar link for the formation of preferences on pension reforms.2 
However, preference formation on pension reform options is more complex than an individual 
retirement decision. For the latter, it is merely the adjustment to the incentives of an exoge-
nously given pension system. For the former, it is the reasoning on parameter changes which 
would serve the individual utility best over the (rest of one’s) life cycle. 
The challenge for a static pay-as-you-go pension system which is not adjusted to an increase 
in longevity is that, in the beginning of a representative insured’s life cycle, his present value 
                                                 
1 Filer and Honig (2005) suggest this analogy for their analysis of endogenous retirement and (private) pension 
decisions. 
2 The literature, according to which monetary early retirement incentives (e.g. through pension cuts for early 
retirement which are too small compared to an actuarially fair cut) are highly effective (see Gruber and Wise 
(2004, 2007) and Börsch-Supan et al. (2004; 2007)), does not falsify the possible impact of intrinsic work moti-
vation on retirement preferences. None of these studies has analyzed to which extent intrinsic work motivation 
proxies have had a significant impact. 
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of received pensions, PVP,  exceeds his present value of contributions, PVC, with the implicit 
individual pension debt, ID = PVP-PVC.3 This development leaves the system unsustainable. 
A reform which wants to restore sustainability would have to cut the ID back to zero. Basical-
ly, this adjustment can occur through changing one of three parameters (or some of them in 
combination): Increasing pension contributions, cutting pensions or lifting retirement age.  
No matter how the adjustment occurs, a representative worker at the beginning of his working 
life will experience a loss of lifetime income from the pension reform which equals ID. This 
is the necessary cut any reform package which targets at restoring systemic sustainability has 
to deliver. Thus, the pension reform options do not differ with respect to their negative in-
come effects over a complete life cycle. 
In spite of an identical income effect (from the perspective of the beginning of working life), 
the reform options would translate differently into individual utility. For workers with a high 
disutility from labor, the higher retirement age will be particular unattractive since it confronts 
them with a substantial loss in leisure. The assessment is different for those with only low 
disutility or even utility from work in the sense that they even would prefer unpaid work over 
sitting at home. For the latter, the longer working lifetime is no loss but utility-enhancing. A 
higher pension age in these cases may also alleviate a binding constraint, which, so far, has 
prevented them from working beyond the pension age before the reform.4 This reform would 
then simply expand the leeway for self-determination, which again reinforces the importance 
of intrinsic motivation, which is particularly powerful in the absence of external restrictions 
(Frey, 1997b). Thus, there is the clear theoretical prediction that a higher pension age should 
be a reform option which is relative attractive for those with low work disutility compared to 
those suffering strongly from any additional working day. 
We would not expect that intrinsic motivation impacts equally positively on the acceptance of 
lower pension payments or higher pension contributions. Both reform proposals are not asso-
ciated with any increase in self-determination. Even if intrinsically motivated workers do not 
                                                 
3 In addition, there is a problem from decreased fertility, which aggravates the mismatch between active work-
ers’ contributions and pensioners’ benefits. This does, however, not change the subsequent reasoning qualitative-
ly. 
4 For Germany, to which our empirical study applies, working beyond the pension age is legally possible without 
substantial economic disincentives (there are no cuts in pensions with additional active labor income). However, 
individual and collective work contracts regularly refer to the official pension age as to the age related contract 
end. Hence, the pension system’s retirement age often imposes a de facto binding constraint on the retirement 
decision. An economic rationale for employers supporting this mandatory retirement age is given by Lazear’s 
famous life cycle- and efficiency wage model (Lazear, 1979). 
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work just for the money, they would not welcome new external interventions which cause 
resistance and crowd out intrinsic motivation (Frey, 1997a). While all three reform options 
(higher contributions, lower benefits, longer working years) confront workers with the same 
income effect ID, only the longer working years option increases the scope for self-
determination and should, thus, be the favorite of people who enjoy their work. 
This conceptual framework also allows identifying further essential determinants which 
should impact on pension reform preferences. In principle, all factors which influence older 
worker’s reservation wage, such as wealth, health or non-labor income, should matter. Fur-
thermore, the position within the life cycle is crucial (age effects have already been acknowl-
edged in the literature, see above) since the income effect of a reform is only identical for 
representative individuals over their complete life cycle. For individuals at different stages in 
the life cycle, reform options are associated with different income effects. Thus, increasing 
pension contributions (PVC) is relatively attractive for older workers and pensioners and unat-
tractive for younger workers, who have to bear these higher contributions over their whole 
working life.5 Conversely, cutting pensions (PVP) is relatively attractive for younger workers 
and less attractive for older workers or pensioners with the latter not benefitting at all from 
savings in contributions. A higher pension age which effectively cuts back PVP is particularly 
unattractive for older workers6 and attractive for younger workers and even more for pension-
ers, who are past the age to be affected.  
 
4. The data 
For our empirical test we use data from the German General Social Survey (Terwey et al., 
2007), which was first conducted in 1980 with subsequent waves every two years.7 The sur-
vey is designed to be representative for the German population and offers data on the individ-
ual labor market status, socio-economic characteristics and policy preferences. For our study, 
we make use of data collected from March to August 2006. In Germany, this period was char-
acterized by a large public and parliamentary debate on the future of the pension system, 
                                                 
5 Sinn and Übelmesser (2002) define the age dependent population split of supporters and opponents to a cutback 
of the pay-as-you-go system on that basis. 
6 This only holds if older workers are not protected by generous transitory arrangements, as it is the case for the 
very slow German phasing in of a higher pension age (from 65 to 67), which only becomes fully effective from 
the year 2029 onwards. 
7 For further information and data availability visit www.gesis.org/en/allbus/. 
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which resulted in the decision to gradually increase the pension age with the relevant law tak-
ing effect in 2007. 
This data base offers all necessary preconditions for testing for the impact of intrinsic motiva-
tion on the acceptance of pension reforms. Besides a rich coverage of socio-economic charac-
teristics, it includes questions on the acceptance of the three basic pension reform options: A 
higher pension age, higher contributions to the pay-as-you-go system and lower pension pay-
ments.8 This specific type of question is particularly useful as it confronts respondents with 
different reform alternatives which are equally able to improve the sustainability of the pay-
as-you-go system. Surveys which only ask for the acceptance or rejection of one reform op-
tion, such as a higher pension age, are confronted with the problem that results could rather 
reflect general reform willingness than the assessment of the specific reform option (Scheubel 
et al., 2009). With that ALLBUS question, this is less of a concern and we are able to measure 
the relative popularity of different reform options independent from the popularity of pension 
reforms in general. 
The survey equally covers a set of questions which can be employed as indicators for the 
complex of intrinsic work motivation and job satisfaction. For instance, the survey partici-
pants answer the question whether they would like to stay employed even without need for 
the money earned or whether they are willing to work harder to support the organization. The 
precise questions run as follows: Our “like work” dummy represents the support for the 
statement “I would like to work even without need for the money” and the “work willingness” 
dummy marks individuals who declare “I am ready to work harder than I have to in order to 
contribute to my firm’s/organization’s success”. The first proxy corresponds closest to Deci’s 
definition of intrinsic motivation (section 2.2) while the second refers rather to the loyalty to 
the specific employer and not so much to intrinsic work motivation in general. 
Both the pension reform preference and the work willingness questions have been fed into the 
ALLBUS survey in the context of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP).9  
                                                 
8 The precise question is as follows: “Currently there is a large discussion in Germany about pensions, the fi-
nancing of pensions and pension age. Below you find three possible measures to solve the problems of the statu-
tory pension system. If you had to decide for one of these, which one would you choose?” with the three answer 
options “To solve the problems of the statutory pension system, the pension age should be increased/ pension 
contributions should be increased/ the statutory pensions should be cut”. An overview on all variable definitions 
including ALLBUS-code is given in the appendix. 
9 The ALLBUS program is promoted by DFG (German Research Society) and GESIS (Institute for Social Sci-
ence), which also conduct the German part of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). The latter pro-
gram was firstly implemented in 1985 and annually collects data for various themes of social science. 
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The descriptive statistics (Table 1) confirm the finding from other studies that a higher pen-
sion age is not a popular solution. If they had to accept one reform, the survey respondents 
would rather opt for higher contributions. The least popular reform is, however, cutting pen-
sions. According to our intrinsic motivation proxies, around two thirds classify as intrinsically 
motivated in the sense that they do not work primarily for the money. About one third is ready 
to work hard for their company to improve the company´s success. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Pension reform preference 
Increase pension age 1295 0.2672 0.4427 0 1 
Higher contributions 1295 0.5606 0.4965 0 1 
Cutting pensions 1295 0.1722 0.3777 0 1 
Controls 
Age < 25 1293 0.1036 0.3049 0 1 
Age >=25, <45 1293 0.3434 0.4750 0 1 
Age >=45, <65 1293 0.3372 0.4729 0 1 
Age >=65 1142 0.3853 0.4869 0 1 
Youth in East 1293 0.1237 0.3294 0 1 
Member of union 1293 0.3016 0.4591 0 1 
Policy interest 1295 0.5058 0.5002 0 1 
Female 1293 0.1036 0.3049 0 1 
Job insecure 1295 0.0718 0.2583 0 1 
University 1284 0.1550 0.3620 0 1 
Unemployed 1295 0.0819 0.2742 0 1 
Not employed 1295 0.5012 0.5002 0 1 
Sick 1295 0.1560 0.3630 0 1 
Married 1295 0.5714 0.4951 0 1 
Civil servant 1295 0.0347 0.1832 0 1 
Entrepreneur 1295 0.0533 0.2247 0 1 
Proxies intrinsic motivation 
Like work 1219 0.6957 0.4603 0 1 
Work willingness 1295 0.3629 0.4810 0 1 
 
 
5. Econometric testing 
In a first step, we model the formation of reform preferences as an independent decision prob-
lem over acceptance or rejection of each single option under consideration. Hence, our de-
pendent variable is binary (1 support for the specific reform option, 0 no support) and we ap-
ply a probit estimation procedure for each of the three policy options (“increase pension age”, 
“higher contributions”, “cutting pensions”). In the next step, we proceed to a multinomial 
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logit modelling, which allows identifying the drivers of relative probabilities between the 
available reform options. 
The inclusion of control variables is guided by our theoretical reasoning. The position in the 
life cycle should impact on policy preferences as explained above so that we include different 
age class dummies (<25, 25-44, and 45-64 years with the pensioner age class 65 and older as 
our point of reference). Furthermore, we account for individual characteristics which should 
affect the reservation wage required to opt for longer working years instead of retirement. 
Among these indicators, we include the fear of a job loss, the employment status (unemployed 
and not employed)10 and sickness. All these factors should push up the reservation wage for 
work in a higher age and, thus, render an early pension as highly desirable. Given the im-
portance of information on pension reform acceptance (see the literature survey above), we 
include an information proxy based on self-assessment (respondent claims that he is interested 
in politics in general). The dummy for university education is an integrated proxy for different 
facets: The degree of information, job satisfaction, but also accumulated wealth – at least the 
latter two factors should lead to a lower reservation wage and a relatively favorable position 
on a higher pension age. We also add control variables which are normally used for modelling 
policy preferences, e.g. in the context of redistribution (youth in east, Alesina and Fuchs-
Schündeln, 2007; union membership). Finally, we supplement standard socio-economic (gen-
der, married) and employment related indicators (entrepreneur, civil servant).11  
Tables 2 to 4 present the probit estimation results.  For each of the policy options the baseline 
including the controls as explained is estimated followed by specifications including the pro-
posed intrinsic motivation indicators consecutively. 
With respect to the general controls, the included proxies confirm our expectation if they are 
significant: The active workers are less willing to accept higher pension ages compared to 
those who already receive pensions (the respondents aged 65 and above are the reference 
group, which was dropped in the regression). Conversely, the working age cohorts are more 
inclined to cut pension payments than today’s pensioners. Interestingly, these effects appear 
to be stronger for the middle aged compared to the very young. Among the other controls, 
                                                 
10 We distinguish between people who are currently unemployed and people not working due to other reasons 
such as maternity, education or disability. 
11 ALLBUS also includes an income variable, which, however, suffers from numerous missing values. An inclu-
sion did not change any of the central results but came at the price of a serious loss in observations. Theory 
would also point to the importance of wealth proxies for older age reservation wages. Suitable wealth indicators 
are not available in the ALLBUS survey. 
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“youth in East”, “policy interest”, “university” and “sick” all prove to be significant in most 
specifications (apart from cutting pension estimations). The signs are as expected: The sick, 
those with youth in the East, without particular interest in politics or without university educa-
tion are less ready to opt for a higher pension age, but prefer higher contributions instead. The 
self-employed differ significantly only with respect to the contribution preference where they 
reject higher contributions. Compared to men, women are more critical of cutting pensions. 
The augmentation of the baselines by our intrinsic work motivation proxies leads to signifi-
cant results for the “like work” and the “work willingness” dummy. The impact of intrinsic 
motivation is as expected: Respondents who would prefer work over leisure even without 
need for the money have a higher probability to support a higher pension age and are less 
likely to opt for higher contributions. The marginal effect allows quantifying the effect: The 
probability that a respondent opts for a higher pension age is 7.8 percentage points higher if 
this person is intrinsically motivated. The loyalty related proxy “work willingness”, however, 
has a smaller impact (4.8 percentage points) and fails to be significant at conventional levels. 
A limitation of the binary approach is that the resulting separate regressions for each of the 
three single reform options do not allow for the cross-equation links. This implies inefficient 
testing given that, by construction of the pension reform question in the ALLBUS survey, the 
answers are dependent. Hence, a multinomial logit is a more efficient estimation approach. 
This procedure allows estimating the impact of covariates on the relative probabilities of an 
individual choosing one of two options. Since the pension reform preference variable has 
three values, it implies the joint estimation of two equations. Tables 5, 6 and 8 present the 
results. The base outcome is the increase of pension age. The relative risk representation is 
chosen; i.e. the coefficients represent a covariate’s impact on the relative probability that one 
of two reform options is preferred. The baseline is followed by specifications augmented by 
each of the intrinsic motivation proxies consecutively. Tables 7 and 9 include the predicted 
probabilities of an individual to opt for each of the three reform options depending on its in-
trinsic motivation (and at mean values for the other control variables). 
The results for the multinomial logit estimations show some differences to the probit results. 
Generally, a more critical screening is required since less control variables keep their signifi-
cance. For instance, the gender variable loses its significance. The age effects are confirmed: 
Active workers are much more likely to opt for lower pensions than for a higher pension age 
(factor 4.6 for the 25-44 age group). An absent university education, a youth in the East and 
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no particular interest in politics are robustly significant and foster a rejection of higher pen-
sion ages relative to the other solutions. 
The intrinsic motivation indicators survive the multinomial testing. As for the probit analysis, 
the “like work” and the “work willingness” proxies turn out to have a significant effect. In-
trinsic motivation along these two dimensions increases the probability that an individual will 
opt for a higher pension age. The predicted probabilities in Tables 7 and 9 report the size of 
the effect. These predictions are calculated for average values of all other covariates and show 
the difference between probabilities for respondents who are and who are not intrinsically 
motivated. For those who would work even without the need for the money earned, the cru-
cial difference is related to a higher probability of opting for higher pension age and a lower 
probability of opting for higher contributions. No marked difference exists for the cutting 
pension preference. For the second significant intrinsic motivation proxy, the willingness to 
work hard for the company, a particular marked difference exists for the cutting pension pref-
erence. Those who feel a large loyalty to their firm or organization are less likely to opt for 
lower pensions. 
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Table 2: Probit estimation, dependent variable: increase of pension age preference 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Age < 25 -0.0423 -0.0457 -0.0516 
 [0.0529] [0.0541] [0.0522] 
Age >=25, <45 -0.0998** -0.0953** -0.110** 
 [0.0426] [0.0440] [0.0428] 
Age >=45, <65 -0.0623 -0.0677 -0.0677* 
 [0.0405] [0.0417] [0.0405] 
Youth in East -0.125*** -0.128*** -0.126*** 
 [0.0260] [0.0265] [0.0260] 
Member of union 0.0327 0.0399 0.0316 
 [0.0416] [0.0430] [0.0416] 
Policy interest 0.114*** 0.105*** 0.111*** 
 [0.0313] [0.0320] [0.0313] 
Female 0.0161 0.00627 0.0157 
 [0.0276] [0.0282] [0.0276] 
Job insecure -0.0654 -0.0529 -0.0596 
 [0.0540] [0.0552] [0.0550] 
University 0.122*** 0.133*** 0.123*** 
 [0.0419] [0.0434] [0.0419] 
Unemployed -0.000321 -0.00377 0.00593 
 [0.0569] [0.0591] [0.0577] 
Not employed 0.0603 0.0750* 0.0840** 
 [0.0378] [0.0385] [0.0417] 
Sick -0.0746** -0.0946*** -0.0732** 
 [0.0348] [0.0342] [0.0349] 
Married 0.0282 0.0298 0.0267 
 [0.0290] [0.0301] [0.0290] 
Civil servant -0.0600 -0.0813 -0.0577 
 [0.0636] [0.0596] [0.0642] 
Entrepreneur 0.103 0.104 0.0961 
 [0.0684] [0.0694] [0.0680] 
Proxy intrinsic motivation 
Like work  0.0785***  
  [0.0284]  
Work willingness   0.0485 
   [0.0363] 
Observations 1127 1068 1127 
Pseudo R2 0.0660 0.0740 0.0674 
Marginal effects, standard errors in brackets. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: Probit estimation, dependent variable: higher contribution preference 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Age < 25 0.00775 0.0295 -0.00385 
 [0.0667] [0.0690] [0.0675] 
Age >=25, <45 -0.0459 -0.0409 -0.0578 
 [0.0544] [0.0565] [0.0551] 
Age >=45, <65 -0.0222 -0.0106 -0.0290 
 [0.0503] [0.0527] [0.0506] 
Youth in East 0.0801*** 0.0762** 0.0783** 
 [0.0310] [0.0321] [0.0311] 
Member of union -0.0583 -0.0524 -0.0589 
 [0.0463] [0.0475] [0.0463] 
Policy interest -0.101*** -0.0902** -0.104*** 
 [0.0345] [0.0357] [0.0346] 
Female 0.0380 0.0443 0.0370 
 [0.0313] [0.0324] [0.0314] 
Job insecure 0.0913 0.0823 0.0991 
 [0.0608] [0.0618] [0.0608] 
University -0.115** -0.131*** -0.115** 
 [0.0449] [0.0465] [0.0449] 
Unemployed -0.0166 -0.0337 -0.0102 
 [0.0643] [0.0676] [0.0643] 
Not employed -0.0291 -0.0314 -0.00240 
 [0.0432] [0.0443] [0.0472] 
Sick 0.124*** 0.144*** 0.125*** 
 [0.0424] [0.0433] [0.0423] 
Married -0.0114 -0.00783 -0.0129 
 [0.0333] [0.0348] [0.0333] 
Civil servant 0.0695 0.0927 0.0735 
 [0.0804] [0.0798] [0.0802] 
Entrepreneur -0.153** -0.159** -0.161** 
 [0.0709] [0.0727] [0.0710] 
Proxy intrinsic motivation 
Like work  -0.0673*  
  [0.0346]  
Work willingness   0.0553 
   [0.0390] 
Observations 1127 1068 1127 
Pseudo R2 0.0391 0.0435 0.0404 
Marginal effects, standard errors in brackets. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Probit estimation, dependent variable: cutting pension preference 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Age < 25 0.0775 0.0472 0.0978 
 [0.0658] [0.0651] [0.0685] 
Age >=25, <45 0.185*** 0.169*** 0.205*** 
 [0.0520] [0.0535] [0.0528] 
Age >=45, <65 0.126*** 0.115** 0.137*** 
 [0.0472] [0.0495] [0.0474] 
Youth in East 0.0447* 0.0516** 0.0484** 
 [0.0236] [0.0247] [0.0237] 
Member of union 0.0294 0.0165 0.0296 
 [0.0347] [0.0353] [0.0348] 
Policy interest -0.0118 -0.0115 -0.00593 
 [0.0248] [0.0259] [0.0250] 
Female -0.0461** -0.0416* -0.0438* 
 [0.0229] [0.0240] [0.0229] 
Job insecure -0.0372 -0.0386 -0.0473 
 [0.0382] [0.0393] [0.0366] 
University -0.00311 -0.00213 -0.00293 
 [0.0323] [0.0338] [0.0321] 
Unemployed 0.0176 0.0394 0.00820 
 [0.0489] [0.0546] [0.0472] 
Not employed -0.0333 -0.0474 -0.0689** 
 [0.0312] [0.0325] [0.0331] 
Sick -0.0446 -0.0418 -0.0462 
 [0.0312] [0.0330] [0.0308] 
Married -0.0158 -0.0225 -0.0139 
 [0.0244] [0.0258] [0.0243] 
Civil servant -0.00940 -0.00757 -0.0152 
 [0.0550] [0.0571] [0.0536] 
Entrepreneur 0.0386 0.0437 0.0561 
 [0.0530] [0.0555] [0.0556] 
Proxy intrinsic motivation 
Like work  -0.00811  
  [0.0265]  
Work willingness   -0.0767*** 
   [0.0248] 
Observations 1,127 1,068 1,127 
Pseudo R2 0.0515 0.0513 0.0601 
Marginal effects, standard errors in brackets. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Multinomial logit estimation – baseline 
 Higher contributions Cutting pensions 
Age < 25 1.1725 2.0104 
 [0.3726] [0.9749] 
Age >=25, <45 1.3731 4.5571*** 
 [0.3529] [1.7935] 
Age >=45, <65 1.2117 2.9295** 
 [0.2818] [1.0937] 
Youth in East 1.9956*** 2.2556*** 
 [0.3228] [0.4631] 
Member of union 0.7974 1.0269 
 [0.1781] [0.2842] 
Policy interest 0.5484*** 0.6150* 
 [0.0892] [0.1321] 
Female 1.0107 0.7139 
 [0.1560] [0.1443] 
Job insecure 1.6288 1.1463 
 [0.6107] [0.5132] 
University 0.5225** 0.6601 
 [0.1071] [0.1761] 
Unemployed 0.9999 1.1784 
 [0.3248] [0.4817] 
Not employed 0.7407 0.6413 
 [0.1563] [0.1773] 
Sick 1.6562* 0.9847 
 [0.3673] [0.3233] 
Married 0.8762 0.8155 
 [0.1446] [0.1731] 
Civil servant 1.434 1.161 
 [0.5900] [0.5791] 
Entrepreneur 0.4997* 0.8311 
 [0.1704] [0.3195] 
Observations 1127  
Pseudo R2 0.0609  
chi2  133.6748  
p  0.000  
Base outcome: Increase of pension age, relative risk exposition. Standard errors in brackets. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Multinomial logit estimation – proxy: like work 
 Higher contributions Cutting pensions 
Age < 25 1.2537 1.7491 
 [0.4194] [0.8857] 
Age >=25, <45 1.3872 4.1020*** 
 [0.3733] [1.6745] 
Age >=45, <65 1.2864 2.8155** 
 [0.3174] [1.0982] 
Youth in East 2.0328*** 2.3799*** 
 [0.3438] [0.5030] 
Member of union 0.7843 0.929 
 [0.1816] [0.2668] 
Policy interest 0.5748** 0.6300* 
 [0.0975] [0.1393] 
Female 1.0525 0.7652 
 [0.1693] [0.1592] 
Job insecure 1.519 1.079 
 [0.5735] [0.4852] 
University 0.4860*** 0.6384 
 [0.1039] [0.1746] 
Unemployed 0.9756 1.319 
 [0.3393] [0.5652] 
Not employed 0.6992 0.5594* 
 [0.1520] [0.1598] 
Sick 1.9256** 1.1456 
 [0.4582] [0.3896] 
Married 0.8772 0.7829 
 [0.1538] [0.1726] 
Civil servant 1.6761 1.3134 
 [0.7116] [0.6697] 
Entrepreneur 0.4891* 0.8461 
 [0.1724] [0.3298] 
Proxy intrinsic motivation 
Like work 0.6434* 0.6774 
 [0.1152] [0.1564] 
Observations 1068  
Pseudo R2 0.0654  
chi2  136.3135  
p  0.000  
Base outcome: Increase of pension age, relative risk exposition. Standard errors in brackets. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 7: Predicted probabilities (like work) 
  Reform preference 
  Increase 
pension age 
Higher  
contributions 
Cutting 
pensions 
Like work 
0 0.1885 0.6389 0.1727 
1 0.2630 0.5737 0.1633 
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Table 8: Multinomial logit estimation – proxy: work willingness 
 Higher contributions Cutting pensions 
Age < 25 1.207 2.3095 
 [0.3877] [1.1251] 
Age >=25, <45 1.4191 5.2716*** 
 [0.3713] [2.0974] 
Age >=45, <65 1.2307 3.1601** 
 [0.2884] [1.1806] 
Youth in East 2.0122*** 2.3300*** 
 [0.3263] [0.4814] 
Member of union 0.7971 1.0423 
 [0.1779] [0.2897] 
Policy interest 0.5507*** 0.6431* 
 [0.0897] [0.1388] 
Female 1.0089 0.7214 
 [0.1559] [0.1460] 
Job insecure 1.6005 1.0317 
 [0.6015] [0.4666] 
University 0.5203** 0.6584 
 [0.1068] [0.1762] 
Unemployed 0.9833 1.0862 
 [0.3204] [0.4458] 
Not employed 0.6963 0.4624* 
 [0.1637] [0.1393] 
Sick 1.6504* 0.9525 
 [0.3664] [0.3136] 
Married 0.8817 0.8277 
 [0.1458] [0.1761] 
Civil servant 1.4414 1.0966 
 [0.5945] [0.5529] 
Entrepreneur 0.5043* 0.9351 
 [0.1724] [0.3620] 
Proxy intrinsic motivation 
Work willingness 0.8864 0.4979** 
 [0.1803] [0.1227] 
Observations 1127  
Pseudo R2 0.0654  
chi2  143.5965  
p  0.000  
Base outcome: Increase of pension age, relative risk exposition. Standard errors in brackets.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 9: Predicted probabilities (work willingness) 
  Reform preference 
  Increase 
pension age 
Higher  
contributions 
Cutting 
pensions 
Work willingness 
0 0.2303 0.5780 0.1917 
1 0.2748 0.6113 0.1139 
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6. Robustness  
Our findings support the empirical relevance of the preceding theoretical reasoning: Respond-
ents with a high degree of intrinsic work motivation are more likely to opt for a postponement 
of the statutory retirement age. However, this result may equally reflect other links in the data 
structure. Although we already control for numerous important individual characteristics, 
missing variables could distort the regression. Thus, it cannot be excluded that intrinsic moti-
vation is linked to a general individual inclination for reform. Furthermore, there is a straight-
forward alternative story which could explain our key result: It could simply be the case that 
workers with a physically demanding job are both less intrinsically motivated and, naturally, 
less optimistic that they would be capable of continuing to work at a higher age (Scheubel et 
al., 2009). In this case, our result would reflect the impact of job characteristics related to 
physical stress. In the following, we check for the reliability of our results with respect to the-
se possible objections and also provide several regression variants to check for the general 
robustness of our findings.  
 
Physical job stress 
With respect to physical job stress, some of our standard control variables already have a 
proxy characteristic in this regard, such as gender, the education variable (university) or the 
profession dummies (civil servant, entrepreneur). In addition, we experimented with the fol-
lowing more direct control variables: (1) A dummy “hard work” which indicates that the re-
spondent has to perform a physical straining job and (2) a dummy variable equal one if the 
respondent is a “blue collar” worker. These additional controls should filter out intrinsic mo-
tivation as far as it is systematically linked to job characteristics. All robustness checks were 
performed for both the probit (not reported) and the multinomial regressions (reported). None 
of the included variables seem to have any significant impact on pension reform preferences 
in the multinomial logit regression, while the significant impact of intrinsic motivation per-
sists in all regressions (see Tables 10 and 11).  
 
General reform inclination 
Our theoretical reasoning for the impact of intrinsic motivation is specific to reforms related 
to working time. If this reasoning is indeed responsible for the data structure, we would not 
expect a significant impact on reform issues unrelated to working times. Significant results for 
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non-work related reform issues would be a hint that intrinsic motivation is just a proxy for 
some other type of important individual characteristic which is not covered by our controls. 
To check for this possibility, we apply a placebo regression. We estimate a similar specifica-
tion as in Table 2, but now for reform issues without any obvious theoretical link to intrinsic 
work motivation. Two different reform options are chosen which are completely unrelated to 
working conditions or working time: First, the approval to municipal suffrage for foreigners 
and, second, the compliance with the need for Islam-teaching at German schools. In none of 
the cases intrinsic motivation is among the significant determinants. This backs our confi-
dence that our results on pension reform preferences are driven by the proposed causal chain 
and not just a general individual inclination to accept change. The results of the regressions 
are presented in Table 12. 
 
Further variants 
The debate on several reform proposals on the German public pension system was strongly 
affected by party and ideological considerations. To account for the possibility that an indi-
vidual’s choice for a certain reform option reflects his party preference or ideology, we con-
trol for the respondent´s ideology by making use of a dummy variable indicating that he has 
classified himself as left-leaning. If, for instance, right-leaning individuals show a higher de-
gree of intrinsic motivation and are also more in favor of longer working years, this would 
also explain our results. The inclusion does not change the substance of the results (these var-
iants and the following ones are included in Tables 10 and 11).  
Having children might also affect a person’s readiness to accept certain pension reforms as it 
might be less desirable to impose the burden of an unsustainable system on future genera-
tions. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that individual’s with children might be, for instance, 
less in favor of higher contributions than those without children. We include a dummy varia-
ble whether there are children at all. Including this variable, however, does not change the 
results. 
Age is an important determinant of preferences for different reform options of the pension 
system as it reflects individual self-interest. Therefore, we employ numerous specification 
changes with respect to the measurement of the age effect (results are not reported but availa-
ble upon request). First, we change the age classification by introducing closer age groups 
(10-year intervals). Second, we control for a non-linear relationship by employing the re-
spondent´s age as well as its square and cube. The results remain unchanged, indicating a ro-
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bust and significant age effect, i.e. younger individuals are more likely to accept pension cuts. 
The significant impact of intrinsic motivation on the reform preferences persists. 
 
Table 10: Multinominal-Logit: Robustness checks, Proxy: Like work 
 
Higher 
contributions
Cutting 
pensions 
Higher 
contributions
Cutting 
pensions 
Higher 
contributions
Cutting 
pensions 
Higher 
contributions 
Cutting 
pensions 
Age < 25 1.4441 2.1034 1.2668 1.6967 1.261 1.7627 1.1977 1.668 
[0.5061] [1.0992] [0.4244] [0.8626] [0.4219] [0.8929] [0.4113] [0.8610] 
Age >=25, <45 1.4293 4.2745*** 1.3802 4.1491*** 1.3968 4.1385*** 1.2679 4.0102*** 
[0.3861] [1.7503] [0.3718] [1.6970] [0.3762] [1.6909] [0.3496] [1.6561] 
Age >=45, <65 1.288 2.8323** 1.2793 2.8573** 1.2925 2.8309** 1.1921 2.6760* 
[0.3179] [1.1050] [0.3161] [1.1155] [0.3193] [1.1047] [0.3006] [1.0544] 
Youth in East 1.9965*** 2.3135*** 2.0253*** 2.4032*** 2.0348*** 2.3812*** 2.0873*** 2.4180*** 
[0.3387] [0.4917] [0.3430] [0.5089] [0.3442] [0.5035] [0.3597] [0.5197] 
Member of  0.7857 0.9275 0.7794 0.9526 0.7812 0.9243 0.7644 0.8454 
Union [0.1820] [0.2668] [0.1811] [0.2743] [0.1808] [0.2655] [0.1792] [0.2477] 
Policy interest 0.5743** 0.6289* 0.5771** 0.6198* 0.5751** 0.6303* 0.5888** 0.666 
 [0.0975] [0.1392] [0.0981] [0.1375] [0.0975] [0.1394] [0.1012] [0.1485] 
Female 1.028 0.7385 1.0724 0.7224 1.0476 0.7598 1.0638 0.7409 
 [0.1663] [0.1550] [0.1771] [0.1547] [0.1687] [0.1583] [0.1745] [0.1573] 
Job insecure 1.5025 1.0683 1.4921 1.1391 1.5526 1.1198 1.556 1.1996 
 [0.5674] [0.4804] [0.5673] [0.5159] [0.5890] [0.5066] [0.6180] [0.5570] 
University 0.4888*** 0.6439 0.4941** 0.6073 0.4742*** 0.6128 0.4573*** 0.6214 
[0.1045] [0.1764] [0.1071] [0.1686] [0.1033] [0.1711] [0.0997] [0.1714] 
Unemployed 1.0097 1.3789 0.981 1.2995 0.9655 1.2977 1.049 1.2544 
 [0.3528] [0.5931] [0.3413] [0.5578] [0.3363] [0.5570] [0.3763] [0.5579] 
Not employed 0.6922 0.5544* 0.7193 0.5192* 0.6845 0.5418* 0.6433* 0.5603* 
 [0.1505] [0.1585] [0.1629] [0.1530] [0.1509] [0.1566] [0.1429] [0.1627] 
Sick 1.9157** 1.1334 1.9317** 1.1394 1.9197** 1.1423 1.7466* 1.0072 
 [0.4562] [0.3859] [0.4596] [0.3881] [0.4569] [0.3885] [0.4238] [0.3547] 
Married 0.8137 0.7034 0.8783 0.7843 0.8784 0.7837 0.9384 0.8356 
 [0.1500] [0.1647] [0.1540] [0.1731] [0.1540] [0.1728] [0.1685] [0.1887] 
Civil Servant 1.669 1.2994 1.7292 1.2175 1.6702 1.3072 1.6897 1.2861 
 [0.7088] [0.6639] [0.7411] [0.6267] [0.7086] [0.6667] [0.7202] [0.6566] 
Entrepreneur 0.4855* 0.8356 0.5072 0.7759 0.4914* 0.8552 0.4643* 0.8411 
 [0.1717] [0.3269] [0.1824] [0.3096] [0.1733] [0.3336] [0.1661] [0.3300] 
Added control variables 
Children 1.3172 1.4451       
 [0.2661] [0.3744]       
Blue collar   1.124 0.7212     
   [0.3286] [0.2539]     
Hard job     0.8557 0.7868   
     [0.2197] [0.2481]   
Left       1.3727 0.9972 
       [0.2378] [0.2212] 
Proxy intrinsic motivation 
Like work 0.6388* 0.6735 0.6453* 0.6697 0.6425* 0.6757 0.6258* 0.7121 
 [0.1146] [0.1558] [0.1157] [0.1550] [0.1151] [0.1560] [0.1145] [0.1687] 
Observations 1068 1068 1068 1068 1068 1068 1023 1023 
Pseudo R2 0.0666  0.0666  0.0657   0.0683 
chi2 138.8169  138.8889  136.924   136.9297 
p 0  0  0   0 
Base outcome: Increase of pension age, relative risk exposition. Standard errors in brackets.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 11: Multinominal-Logit: Robustness checks, Proxy: Work willingness 
 
Higher 
contributions
Cutting 
pensions 
Higher 
contributions
Cutting 
pensions 
Higher 
contributions
Cutting 
pensions 
Higher 
contributions 
Cutting 
pensions 
Age < 25 1.3831 2.7123* 1.2257 2.26 1.21 2.3284 1.1543 1.9876 
[0.4633] [1.3634] [0.3944] [1.1053] [0.3888] [1.1347] [0.3821] [1.0003] 
Age >=25, <45 1.4602 5.4722*** 1.4055 5.3419*** 1.4226 5.3097*** 1.3304 5.0324*** 
[0.3833] [2.1844] [0.3682] [2.1294] [0.3724] [2.1144] [0.3558] [2.0290] 
Age >=45, <65 1.2284 3.1663** 1.2188 3.1974** 1.2329 3.1714** 1.1595 3.0108** 
[0.2879] [1.1832] [0.2860] [1.1952] [0.2891] [1.1850] [0.2780] [1.1396] 
Youth in East 1.9786*** 2.2765*** 2.0020*** 2.3423*** 2.0123*** 2.3309*** 2.0829*** 2.4142*** 
[0.3217] [0.4727] [0.3250] [0.4845] [0.3263] [0.4817] [0.3444] [0.5088] 
Member of  0.7969 1.0396 0.7879 1.0668 0.7964 1.0381 0.804 0.9794 
Union [0.1782] [0.2895] [0.1766] [0.2974] [0.1778] [0.2888] [0.1829] [0.2792] 
Policy interest 0.5481*** 0.6397* 0.5545*** 0.6335* 0.5506*** 0.6426* 0.5611*** 0.669 
 [0.0894] [0.1383] [0.0905] [0.1372] [0.0897] [0.1388] [0.0927] [0.1462] 
Female 0.9804 0.6951 1.0391 0.6814 1.0072 0.7169 0.9966 0.6855 
 [0.1529] [0.1424] [0.1647] [0.1419] [0.1559] [0.1453] [0.1570] [0.1418] 
Job insecure 1.5894 1.0257 1.5487 1.0907 1.6133 1.0648 1.6038 1.1379 
 [0.5975] [0.4639] [0.5864] [0.4970] [0.6090] [0.4840] [0.6344] [0.5316] 
University 0.5204** 0.6599 0.5343** 0.629 0.5157** 0.6384 0.4952*** 0.6474 
[0.1069] [0.1768] [0.1112] [0.1707] [0.1076] [0.1736] [0.1036] [0.1750] 
Unemployed 1.0114 1.1211 0.9917 1.0725 0.9803 1.0744 1.0477 1.0476 
 [0.3304] [0.4608] [0.3232] [0.4408] [0.3198] [0.4415] [0.3501] [0.4469] 
Not employed 0.687 0.4570** 0.7306 0.4305** 0.6912 0.4496** 0.6084* 0.4449** 
 [0.1617] [0.1377] [0.1780] [0.1336] [0.1640] [0.1369] [0.1472] [0.1378] 
Sick 1.6481* 0.9495 1.6586* 0.944 1.6487* 0.9517 1.5015 0.8378 
 [0.3662] [0.3128] [0.3683] [0.3115] [0.3661] [0.3133] [0.3402] [0.2865] 
Married 0.8218 0.7571 0.883 0.8313 0.8828 0.829 0.9227 0.8472 
 [0.1422] [0.1704] [0.1461] [0.1772] [0.1460] [0.1765] [0.1572] [0.1855] 
Civil Servant 1.4364 1.0847 1.5141 1.0179 1.4396 1.09 1.4177 1.0632 
 [0.5928] [0.5482] [0.6304] [0.5186] [0.5935] [0.5501] [0.5878] [0.5378] 
Entrepreneur 0.4992* 0.9226 0.5333 0.8658 0.5059* 0.9501 0.4842* 0.9089 
 [0.1712] [0.3583] [0.1859] [0.3423] [0.1731] [0.3684] [0.1679] [0.3541] 
Added control variables 
Children 1.3196 1.3887       
 [0.2544] [0.3506]       
Blue collar   1.2279 0.7406     
   [0.3552] [0.2604]     
Hard job     0.9381 0.8187   
     [0.2384] [0.2584]   
Left       1.3198 0.9993 
       [0.2189] [0.2160] 
Proxy intrinsic motivation 
Work  0.8834 0.4959** 0.8904 0.4934** 0.8881 0.4968** 0.8131 0.5016** 
willingness [0.1799] [0.1224] [0.1812] [0.1219] [0.1805] [0.1225] [0.1704] [0.1268] 
Observations 1127 1127 1127 1127 1127 1127 1078 1078 
Pseudo R2 0.0665  0.0669  0.0656  0.0681  
chi2 146.055  147.0021  144.0257  143.6289  
p 0  0  0  0  
Base outcome: Increase of pension age, relative risk exposition. Standard errors in brackets.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 12: Probit estimation: Placebo regression 
 Municipal 
Suffrage 
Municipal 
Suffrage 
Islam 
Teaching 
Islam 
Teaching 
Age < 25 0.116* 0.185*** 0.181*** 0.117*** 
 [0.0610] [0.0406] [0.0653] [0.0427] 
Age >=25, <45 0.0773 0.119*** 0.122*** 0.107*** 
 [0.0480] [0.0324] [0.0457] [0.0307] 
Age >=45, <65 0.0488 0.0825*** 0.108** 0.0979*** 
 [0.0448] [0.0300] [0.0424] [0.0281] 
Youth in East 0.0364 0.0467** -0.280*** -0.266*** 
 [0.0284] [0.0194] [0.0219] [0.0154] 
Member of union 0.0580 0.0677** 0.0270 0.00840 
 [0.0413] [0.0291] [0.0372] [0.0264] 
Policy interest 0.0705** 0.0513** 0.0823*** 0.0823*** 
 [0.0313] [0.0213] [0.0290] [0.0200] 
Female 0.0143 0.00257 0.0784*** 0.0717*** 
 [0.0283] [0.0193] [0.0252] [0.0176] 
Job insecure -0.0698 -0.0506 0.0554 0.0223 
 [0.0526] [0.0371] [0.0531] [0.0368] 
University 0.0395 0.0980*** 0.0912** 0.0857*** 
 [0.0410] [0.0273] [0.0402] [0.0266] 
Unemployed -0.0911* -0.0809** -0.0867* -0.0622* 
 [0.0553] [0.0380] [0.0449] [0.0333] 
Not employed 0.0568 0.0474* 0.0854** 0.0883*** 
 [0.0382] [0.0271] [0.0332] [0.0241] 
Sick -0.114*** -0.0474* -0.0264 -0.0406* 
 [0.0382] [0.0270] [0.0353] [0.0241] 
Married 0.00881 0.0126 0.0513* 0.0380** 
 [0.0301] [0.0206] [0.0267] [0.0186] 
Civil servant 0.105 0.0547 0.0510 0.0738 
 [0.0776] [0.0547] [0.0701] [0.0518] 
Entrepreneur 0.0893 0.101** 0.0202 0.0243 
 [0.0621] [0.0424] [0.0578] [0.0399] 
Proxies intrinsic motivation 
Like work 0.00141  0.0377  
 [0.0303]  [0.0261]  
Work willingness  -0.00463  -0.0114 
  [0.0262]  [0.0237] 
Observations 1,377 2,909 1,360 2,885 
Pseudo R2 0.0182 0.0186 0.126 0.104 
Marginal effects, standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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7. Conclusion 
Our findings suggest that intrinsic work motivation is indeed a relevant driver of work-related 
reform processes – at least with respect to the formation of pension reform preferences. The 
empirical results confirm the predictions of our theoretical reasoning, which makes a clear 
case for the existence of such a link. Our intrinsic motivation proxies prove to be robustly 
significant in a series of econometric tests, in which we pay careful attention to an individu-
al’s physical job stress and apply numerous modifications to the included control variables. 
For a multitude of specifications, respondents who experience utility from their work beyond 
the money they earn are more willing to embark on reforms leading to a higher pension age.  
This key result has implications both for the intrinsic motivation literature and our under-
standing of reform processes. So far, intrinsic motivation has been recognized to be important 
for the efficiency of firms and organizations. Our findings point beyond that insight towards 
the formation of policy preferences and the adaptability of modern welfare states and socie-
ties. A lack of non-monetary incentives will contribute to the blockade of reforms which re-
quire more work effort. Hence, a society for which work is perceived as a nuisance will have 
much larger problems to adjust to the necessities of demographic change compared to a socie-
ty with high work ethics.  
We know from the intrinsic motivation literature that this type of motivation is not purely 
exogenous. For example, adequate payment systems are known to foster job satisfaction and 
performance (Ockenfels et al., 2010). With our results, this type of findings can be interpreted 
in a new light. Indirectly, the same measures would also help to transform reform preferences 
and the available policy space for reform decisions. Policies that target at increasing the ac-
ceptance for longer working years or working hours should, therefore, invest high efforts in 
increasing job satisfaction. In this sense, governments should be aware that the acceptance of 
work related reforms is partially determined at the workplace. 
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Appendix: Variable definitions 
Variable  Unit Explanation Categories ALLBUS code* 
Reform Option Indicator 
Increase of 
pension age 
preference 
Dummy 
Increase of pension age to solve the 
problems of the public pension 
system. 
1 if the respondent approves, 0 
otherwise. v605 
Higher contri-
bution prefer-
ence 
Dummy 
Higher contributions to solve the 
problems of the public pension 
system. 
1 if the respondent approves, 0 
otherwise. v605 
Cutting pension 
preference Dummy 
Lower pension payment from pub-
lic pension system as solution of the 
current and facing problems. 
1 if the respondent approves, 0 
otherwise. v605 
Controls 
Age < 25 Dummy Younger than 25 years. 1 for respondents aged 18 to 24, 0 otherwise. v27 
Age >=25, <45 Dummy Between 25 and 45 years old. 1 for respondents aged 25 to 45, 0 otherwise. v27 
Age >=45, <65 Dummy Between 45 and 65 years old. 1 for respondents aged 45 to 65, 0 otherwise. v27 
Job insecure Dummy Job insecurity of the respondent. 
1 if the respondent is employed 
and is afraid of becoming unem-
ployed, 0 otherwise. 
v188, v210 
Unemployed Dummy Employment status of the respond-ent. 
1 if the respondent is currently 
unemployed, 0 otherwise. v188, v217
 
Not employed Dummy Employment status of the respond-ent. 
1 if the respondent is currently not 
employed (e.g. including materni-
ty, unemployment, disability, 
pension), 0 otherwise. 
v188 
Civil servant Dummy Occupational position of the re-spondent: civil servant. 
1 if the respondent is a civil serv-
ant, 0 otherwise. v188, v189
 
Entrepreneur Dummy 
Occupational position of the re-
spondent: entrepreneur or self-
employed professional. 
1 if the respondent is self-
employed, 0 otherwise. v188, v189 
Sick Dummy Health condition of the respondent. 1 if the respondent feels not (very) healthy, 0 otherwise. v241 
University Dummy Respondent’s educational level. 
1 if the respondent has a universi-
ty (for applied science) degree, 0 
otherwise. 
v184, v185 
Policy interest Dummy Respondent claims to be interested in politics. 
1 if the respondent approves, 0 
otherwise. v139
 
Member of 
union Dummy Membership in a trade union. 
1 if the respondent is a member of 
a trade union, 0 otherwise. v503
 
Youth in East Dummy State in which the respondent spent his youth. 
1 if the respondent spent his youth 
in the former GDR, 0 otherwise. v37 
Female Dummy Sex of the respondent. 1 if the respondent is female, 0 otherwise. v174
 
Married Dummy Marital status of the respondent. 1 if the respondent is married, 0 otherwise. v242
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Intrinsic Work Motivation 
Like work Dummy Willingness to work, even if there is no need for money. 
1 if the respondent strongly ap-
proves, 0 otherwise. v536 
Work 
willingness Dummy 
Willingness to work harder to 
support the firm or organization. 
1 if the respondent is employed 
and is willing to work harder, 
0 otherwise. 
v578, v188 
Placebo Regression 
Municipal 
Suffrage Dummy 
Reform proposal: Municipal suf-
frage for foreigner. 
1 if the respondent approves, 0 
otherwise. v104 
Islam Teaching Dummy Reform proposal: Islam teaching at state schools in Germany. 
1 if the respondent approves, 0 
otherwise. v105 
Robustness Checks 
Children Dummy Children living in the respondent’s household. 
1 if the respondent has at least one 
child, 0 otherwise. v443 
Blue collar Dummy Respondent´s job position. 
1 if the respondent is employed 
and is a blue collar worker,  
0 if not. 
v188, v189 
Hard Job Dummy Respondent has a physically de-manding job. 
1 if the respondent is employed 
and has to perform a physically 
demanding job, 0 otherwise. 
v188, v564 
Left Dummy Self-assessment of respondent´s ideology. 
1 if the respondent classifies 
herself as left, 0 otherwise. v145 
 * The codes referring to the questions are taken from the German Codebook (Terwey et al., 2007). 
